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The 25th of September 2009, the European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas 
(hereafter “ERGEG”) in cooperation with the Bundesnetzagentur and the Florence 
School of Regulation organized a Workshop on unbundling and corporate 
governance in the 3rd Package. The workshop was organized to present and discuss 
the practical impacts of implementing inter alia the 2009 Electricity Directive 
2009/72/EC Natural Gas Directive 2009/72/EC (hereafter “EU-Directives”) into 
national law. Participants came from transmission system operators, regulatory 
authorities, academia and the European Commission. The objective of the workshop 
was to introduce those problems that might arise when transposing the new 
legislation into national law, namely with regard to the implementation of ownership 
unbundling, the new Independent System Operator (hereafter “ISO”) model and 
particularly the Independent Transmission Operator (hereafter “ITO”) model. In this 
respect, possible impacts on corporate governance rules - principally based on the 
2004 OECD Corporate Governance Codex on the unbundling of energy utilities - 
have been highlighted.  
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I. Introduction 
 
The unbundling, i.e. the separation of the network business (natural monopoly) from 
the activities of production and supply is a pre-requisite for effective competition and 
thus a key component of the liberalization process in Europe. Achieving this 
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separation is the purpose of the unbundling provisions in the new electricity and gas 
directives: With the coming into force of the third legislative package (01/03/2011), a 
new unbundling regime will be introduced with the EU-Directives. The implementation 
of the required forms of unbundling into national law affects the compliance of energy 
utilities and network operators with corporate governance obligations as anchored 
e.g. in the OECD Corporate Governance Code as well as the respective national 
corporate laws. Both the regulators as well as the Member States when implementing 
the EU-Directives have to be aware of these governance issues in order to perform 
adequate regulation.  
 
The workshop provided an overview of the upcoming rules on unbundling, particularly 
the construction of the ITO model and the basics of the EU company law and 
corporate governance. Furthermore, effects of the financial crisis and regulatory 
performance have been addressed, followed by a case example from the 
telecommunication sector. The final discussion involved the identification of potential 
areas of conflict between corporate governance and the ITO model, illustrated in the 
framework of the corporate law. 
 
II. The Legislative Framework for the Corporate 
Governance Structure of European Energy Utilities 
by Mag. Johannes Mayer (E-Control) 
 
The legislative framework of the new unbundling system provides for the three 
different models for different degrees of structural separation. At first glance, the ISO 
and particularly the ITO model seem to be the less interfering and thus the analysis 
concentrated on these models.  
 
1. General Principles of Unbundling 
 
Assessing the impact of the new unbundling regime on corporate governance at 
national level, the guiding principles of unbundling need to be clarified. First, the 
unbundling of functions implies that the management and staff of the system operator 
shall not be involved in any competitive business, i.e. generation, production and 
supply of energy.  Another crucial requirement is their independent identity: 
According to Article 17 (4) of the EU-Directives, the TSO shall not in its branding 
create confusion in respect of the separate identity of the vertically integrated 
undertaking. Secondly, effective unbundling demands for the unbundling of 
professional interest, i.e. there is a need for ensuring independent incentives, only 
related to the network business. Thirdly, the unbundling of decisions is necessary: 
Ensuring effective decision-making rights means that decisions must be made 
independently from competitive business units. Lastly, the unbundling of information 
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requires that there is no privilege in information flows between the network operator 
and the integrated company.  
 
2. The Independent System Operator (ISO) Model 
 
As an exemption to full ownership unbundling, Articles 13/ 14 f. of the EU-Directives 
provide for the ISO model. It foresees the appointment of an independent system 
operator whereas the vertically integrated company retains the ownership of the 
network on the condition that it is actually managed by a completely independent 
company or body. The ISO is responsible for operating, maintaining and developing 
the transmission system and investment. Conversely, the asset owner has no 
responsibility and no prerogatives with regard to investment planning, which basically 
reduces its function to a financial investor. The asset owner is under the obligation to 
finance the investments decided by the ISO and approved by the regulatory 
authority. Financing can only be denied in case of violations; if the financial 
framework fits, there is the obligation to finance. The asset owner has to provide for 
the coverage of liability relating to the network assets. According to the Article 14 (5) 
(c) (natural gas) and/or 13 (5) (c) (electricity) of the EU-Directives, this excludes the 
liability relating to the tasks of the ISO. Thus, it is rather questionable which liability 
remains for the asset owner, which can only be that the asset owner must cover 
liability e.g. for the condition, but not the management of the network. Since the ISO 
model is a strongly regulated alternative, its popularity is rather low in the Member 
States and even lower in the undertakings.  
 
3. The Independent Transmission Operator (ITO) 
 
The third option besides ownership unbundling and the ISO model is the setting up of 
an ITO. Here, the energy companies remain vertically integrated. In practice this 
means that the TSO has to own the necessary assets (network and any other assets 
necessary for the activity of transmission), and must be equipped with sufficient 
human, technical, physical and financial resources in order to ensure independent 
decision making and carry out the activity of electricity or gas transmission. 
Eventually, the EU-Directives provide for an independent decision-making right of the 
ITO concerning the assets necessary to operate, maintain or develop the 
transmission system. Finally, the ITO must have inter alia the power to raise money 
on the capital market through borrowing and capital increase.  
Other basic characteristics of the ITO are the confidentiality of information flows as 
well as the required independent management and staff. Staff which is necessary for 
the activity of electricity transmission, i.e. for performing the core activities of the ITO 
including management and network operation, have to be employed by the ITO. 
Whereas contracting of services by the vertically integrated undertaking to the ITO is 
prohibited, vice versa the provision of services by the ITO to the vertically integrated 
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undertaking is allowed under specific circumstances, if the national regulatory 
authority approves it.  
Part of the ITO model is the establishment of a supervisory body – not a constitutive 
element in all of the allowed legal forms referenced to by Council Directive 
68/151/EEC. The supervisory body is in charge of decisions with significant impact 
on value of assets of the shareholders within the ITO, i.e. the approval of the budget, 
financial plans, the level of indebtedness of the ITO and the amount of dividends 
distributed to shareholders. However, the supervisory body has no say in the day-to-
day activities of the ITO. The independence of the supervisory body is ensured by the 
requirement that at least half of its members minus one must be professionally 
independent of the vertically integrated company, which has to be ensured by the 
national regulatory authority.  
 
4. Conclusion and Remarks 
 
The main idea of unbundling is the utmost separation of two integrated parts of a 
company. The holding company acts either as a ‘qualified bank’ or has to divest. All 
relations, i.e. services, financial, commercial are either not allowed or have to be 
approved by the national regulatory authority. All communication has to be monitored 
by the national regulatory authority as well. In the light of the corporate governance 
principles, there seem to be general unbridgeable obstacles. Problems arise 
particularly with view at the necessary monitoring and the restrictions on information 
flows: if for instance all communications have to be monitored, which goes up to even 
e-mails, there is an enormous amount of work to do so which has decisive impact on 
the respective company as well. Problems start with the identification of what has 
been communicated which even leads to disturbances of the everyday business. 
Moreover, information also those that are relevant, e.g. personal decisions, obviously 
are delivered to the holding company. However, even the idea of unbundling of 
information is clear in principle, its remains open which are relevant information.  
 
Particular problems arise when it comes to the issue of branding. The EU-Directives 
provide for clear differentiations in order to avoid confusion for the customer: the TSO 
shall not, in its branding, create confusion in respect of the separate identity of the 
vertically integrated undertaking. The scope of interpretation of this provision is rather 
broad, since it is e.g. not explicitly said that different brands are required. Interpreted 
broadly, e.g. the names of TSO and the supply company could remain the same. 
However, the Community trademark law can serve as a point of reference which 
leads to the result that it will not be possible to use the same name. 
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III. EU Company Law and Corporate Governance 
by Prof. Dr. Jaap W. Winter (de Brauw Blackstone Westbrock & University of Amsterdam) 
 
The upcoming unbundling rules need to be seen in the light of the EU company law 
and corporate governance. Corporate governance rules were created mainly in order 
to protect outsiders (for example shareholders, creditors or employees). 
Shareholders of companies bear the ultimate risk for they are served last if anything 
goes wrong with the company. The system tries to stress the Principal – Agent roles 
in companies.  Company law in the EU still varies from one Member States to the 
other. The process of harmonization is related to the right of establishment of 
companies. Most of the initiatives taken at EU level in the area of company law have 
been based on Article 44 (2) g (ex 54) of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community which appears in the chapter devoted on the freedom of establishment, 
i.e. the right of entities, once established in the EU to move their enterprise within the 
EU. This freedom could not be used fully if the respective company laws are not 
similar to a very large extent. At this point the idea of harmonisation started: the 
harmonisation of a number of minimum requirements makes it easier for companies 
to establish themselves in other Member States, i.e. where the regulatory framework 
is similar and might ensure legal certainty in intra-Community operations. 
 
1. Harmonisation Process 
 
However, the view at the harmonization process shows only fragile results. Resulting 
from a tendency of the Member States to agree only on what they have already at 
their own national level company law as an outcome of harmonization, there is little 
substance. For example, the 13th Company Law Directive 2004/25/EC, which covers 
(hostile) takeovers of public listed companies which were meant to facilitate the level 
playing field for takeover bids, instead led to the opposite. However, understood as a 
motor of convergence, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) contributed to a large 
extent to harmonization. According to its relevant decisions on the freedom of 
establishment, the Member States cannot refuse to accept or apply their own 
company law rules on companies incorporated in other Member States. As a 
consequence of the respective judgments, e.g. Germany and France started making 
their company law simpler in order to reduce the incentive to establish legal forms 
such as the UK limited. Thus, harmonization took place in an ‘alternative way’. The 
result is a sweeping development of simplification and flexibilisation of Member 
States’ company law by national initiatives. There is convergence to common 
denominator rather than harmonisation by agreement. Nevertheless, the EU 
approach is on a wobbly basis. The system is not really working since it is not 
delivering what it could deliver. If this continues the system will move to an American, 
more detailed regulation approach. The infrastructure is very weak because there is 
no code requirement for the Member States. France for instance has a voluntary 
code system, with no legal obligation for companies to follow this code. Moreover, 
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there is no consistent system of monitoring and amendment of codes and no 
understanding of quality of explanations.  In sum, the code experiment in the EU is 
not taken seriously enough. Naturally, there is a strong protection of national 
interests. While assuming having a proper governance regulation and system in the 
EU, in the end the code system might not work at all. In order to create a more 
stringent system there is a need for a new governance agenda. There is of course no 
evidence whether the governance EU style works, and if, so why and when (and why 
and when not). Finally, serious concerns remain.  
 
2. Conclusion and Remarks 
 
Against this background, the construction of the ITO model makes no sense, seen 
from the governance perspective. One decisive example is the role of the supervisory 
board: its function is restricted to the key fundamental position. If that is the only task 
of the supervisory body there will be a clash with most Member States’ corporate 
laws, because there, they have much more tasks. If they do not follow them, liability 
issues towards their principals (shareholders) arise. Nevertheless it has to be kept in 
mind that, with the 2009 EU-Directives, it is rather a purely technical question to 
transform the unbundling requirements, particularly to construct the ITO model into 
national law, than it is up to the market to react on it, i.e. up to the players, energy 
companies and the security markets whether they accept the legal separation. The 
task to find just a way to transform it into the respective national law is legally (in a 
technical sense) possible without problems. Despite the legal feasibility, however, the 
EU-Directives seem to predict that the ITO model is almost impossible to implement. 
The practical implementation will demonstrate it.  
 
IV. Lessons from the Financial Market Crisis Designing 
Supervision and Control of Transmission System 
Operators 
by Prof. Dr. Helmut Siekmann (Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability, 
IMFS) 
 
1. Introductory Insights from the Financial Market Crisis 
 
Basic insight from the financial market crisis is that measures of self-regulation have 
demonstrated a very poor performance. The participation of regulated industries in 
the process of law-making ought to be eliminated as far as possible. From financial 
markets it can be also learned that government influence is of ambiguous nature. 
There is no clear evidence that intervention of politics caused or exaggerated the 
crisis. If the field to be regulated is so crucial for the common welfare, governments 
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have to step in and in case of distress they need close control of it. A full 
transparency of risks is indispensable. With regard to the financial crisis, the 
widespread complexity of norms was a major contributing factor. A natural monopoly 
in reality usually decreases the average costs, but not necessarily. Examples for 
natural monopolies are railroads, natural gas and electricity networks or 
telecommunication. In order to make competition possible in natural monopolies, the 
European and national energy legislation provides for three regulatory instruments 
such as the free and non-discriminatory access to the infrastructure for competing 
energy producer, the regulation of tariffs for using the transmission-networks and the 
unbundling of the vertically integrated companies.  
 
2. Legal Basis for Ownership Unbundling 
 
Regarding the competence of the Community to introduce ownership unbundling, 
Article 95 EC Treaty, the internal market competence has been used. Since 
electricity as well as gas were qualified as goods, this competence title could be 
consulted since it allows for the creation of a European internal market, i.e. an area 
where goods as electricity and natural gas circulate freely. The ownership unbundling 
of vertically integrated companies actually pursues the objective to improve the 
conditions for a functioning of the internal energy market. The different level of 
unbundling in the Member States causes the concrete danger of hampering the cross 
border exchange of goods such as electricity or natural gas.  A barrier for exercising 
this power, which has been discussed broadly in the legal literature, could be seen in 
Article 295 EC Treaty, which states that the EC Treaty shall in no way prejudice the 
rules in the Member States governing the system of property ownership. Here there 
is a field of tension between the Community objective of a harmonization of the 
internal market and the interest of the Member States not to lose the freedom of 
manoeuvre in this area. The decision depends on the interpretation of the system of 
property ownership in Article 295 EC Treaty.  According to a rather tight interpretation 
of the ECJ, Article 295 EC Treaty does not prevent the EC from introducing the 
separation of vertically integrated companies: Article 295 EC Treaty must be 
interpreted in a way that it only determines that nationalization or privatization of 
property ownership is not an issue for the Union, but for the Member States 
themselves.  
 
3. Supervision and Control of the Vertically Integrated Enterprise 
 
The EU-Directives try to secure the independence of those parts that stay in natural 
monopoly, such as the transmission network. The stipulated independence of the 
TSO means effectively independent decision-making rights. There are, however, 
some problems, such as unclear boundaries, unresolved conflict of interest, the 
appropriation of funds for investments in transmission system and an opaque 
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incentive structure. Eventually too many details will be left to individual agreements 
which are not transparent to the capital market. On the other hand, it should be 
noted, that system operators in a regulated environment are a very low risk business 
since operators virtually have a “taxing power” towards network users. Limiting the 
influence on the TSO within the vertically integrated company therefore does not 
create the same kind of problems of limitation of liability as in competitive markets. 
In parallel to the legal provisions on unbundling, there is the European Regulators 
Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG) 2008 Guidelines on “Functional and 
Informational Unbundling”. These legally not binding guidelines are of questionable 
legal status. There is some evidence in legal doctrine that this kind of cooperation 
and/or group, are risky constructions from a constitutional law point of view.  
With corporate governance principles the problem is similar: all those codices are no 
legal norms, they might have a legal implication but they are no legal norms as such. 
Their function is primarily to foster capital markets and their efficiency. An important 
theme of corporate governance is to ensure the accountability of certain individuals in 
an organization through mechanisms that try to reduce or eliminate the principal-
agent problem. Since the corporate governance rules are no legal norms, their 
implementation in national statutes does not prevent the national legislation to set up 
different rules for utilities. The future might be the adoption of guidelines by the 
Commission, Article 14 (3) Electricity Directive, and/or Article 15 (3) Natural Gas 
Directive which allow for the adoption of guidelines “designed to amend non-essential 
elements of the Directive by supplementing it”.  
Additionally, there are the framework guidelines of the Agency for the Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators (ACER) based on Article 4 of new Regulation (EC) No. 713/2009. 
Also these guidelines are non binding. It is already problematic that the ACER gets 
the power to issue guidelines. And even though being named “guidelines”, in 
essence, they have to be binding, whereas the ACER lacks the necessary 
competence.  
Regarding the monitoring/ controlling via the national regulatory authorities, there is 
something new in the EU-Directives, which is the guarantee of independence: 
“Member States shall ensure that the regulatory authority ensures that its staff and 
the persons responsible for its management do not seek or take direct instruction 
from any government or other public or private entity when carrying out regulatory 
tasks”, see Article 35 (4) Electricity Directive; Article 39 Gas Directive. In sum, the 
requirements for autonomy and independence are very strict. Conversely, it has not 
been proven that political influence on supervisory agencies contributed in a 
significant way to the present crisis or other major malfunction of the economy. It is 
questionable whether these provisions can be upheld in view of democratic principles 
in EU-law and e.g. in the German Federal Constitution.  
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4. The Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators  
 
Concerning ACER, already its supervisory power is rather questionable: ACER was 
established by Article 1 (1) of Regulation (EC) 713/2009. The creation of ACER was 
based on the single market clause of Article 95 of the EC Treaty. The ECJ in its 
judgement in the ‘ENISA’ case confirmed that the establishment of Community 
agencies can be based on this legal basis. The ECJ here had the first time the 
occasion to decide whether the establishment of agencies is generally possible under 
Article 95 EC Treaty and confirmed it. It is however questionable that there is a 
proven need for that agency in the energy market as required in this provision. The 
problematic issues is also if and to what extent powers can be given to the required 
extent to such an agency. It is a recognized principle that the EU cannot establish 
independent authorities with wide discretionary powers (institutional balance). The 
so-called Meroni-doctrine is an indicator: ‘institutions cannot confer upon the 
authority, powers different from those which the delegating authority itself received 
under the Treaty’; ‘for a delegation of powers to be compatible with the Treaty, it had 
to involve only clearly defined executive powers the exercise of which can, therefore, 
be subject to strict review in the light of criteria determined by the delegating 
authority.’ 
 
5. Conclusion and Remarks 
 
The separation and unbundling issue is not problematic from legal point of view. Non-
compliance with corporate governance principles does not create major problems for 
the companies since corporate governance codes are not even codified law.  More 
problematic seems to be the competences and tasks of ACER. Where is the actual 
gap that ACER might fill? Experience shows that whenever the cost and benefit are 
not in the same country it is very difficult for the national regulatory authority to decide 
in the European interest. At the moment, the regulatory authorities are bound by 
national legislation, i.e. they concentrate on the national interest and national benefit 
and there is nothing that allows for considering the European interest.  In sum, being 
in alliance with the basic principles of EU law, ACER is supposed to have not more 
and/or no stronger competences.  
 
V. A case example: BT Openreach 
by Dr. Chris Doyle (Apex Economics) 
 
Finally, the case example from the telecommunication sector, the case of “BT 
Openreach” demonstrated that for example those governance structures established 
in order to oversee Openreach in the UK have functioned effectively. The oversight 
combines self-regulation (reinforced by legally binding commitments) independent 
audit and external regulation. The structure in practice is complex, but probably no 
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more than similar structures found in the financial sector. The governance 
arrangements have adapted well to changing circumstances. The process was not an 
extreme effort for the regulator, but only an administratively detailed (hence relatively 
costly) process and has cost BT Openreach a huge amount of money to establish 
and increase Opex. The European Commission has advocated the need for 
functional separation as an ultimate measure. There is much opposition to functional 
separation among operators and regulators. A number of national regulatory 
authorities have chosen not to apply functional separation, others have threatened 
application, and some incumbents have volunteered application. In sum, the case 
study demonstrated feasibility; however, it is unclear whether the form of unbundling 
implemented in the case would be fully compatible with the requirements of the 
energy Directive. 
 
VI. Open Discussion with Panel 
Nicolaas Bel (European Commission) 
Johannes Kindler (Vice President BNetzA, Germany) 
Jose Braz (ERSE, Portugal) 
Prof.  Dr. Helmut Siekmann (Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability, 
IMFS) 
Chair: Prof. Dr. Theodor Baums (University of Frankfurt) 
 
The panel discussion guided by Prof. Theodor Baums emphasized the 
implementation of the ITO model and related to the preparatory note for ERGEG 
Members on the Panel provided by Karsten Bourwieg (BNetzA) and Sven Rode 
(BNetzA).  
 
1. The Legal Form 
 
Article 17 (3) of the EU-Directives offer different options for the choice of corporate 
structure for the ITO. The ITOs shall be organised in one of the legal forms as 
referred to in Article 1 of Council Directive 68/151/EEC. Not included in this Directive 
is for instance the Societas Europaea, a form of European public limited company 
that has been possible since 2004. It is questionable why this legal form has not 
been included and whether the Member States when implementing it might be 
allowed to correct it. While it can be argued that the European “effet utile” obliges 
Member States to fill the gap, the Commission seems very reluctant about extensive 
interpretation of the Directives.  
With regard to the adequate legal form, despite several advantages, the discussion 
showed that the legal form of a private limited company or limited liability company 
(LLC), for example the French S.A.R.L. or the German GmbH, would not be the best 
solution. Generally, the independence of the TSO should be as much as possible 
designed on the basis of existing corporate law. A public limited company (e.g. the 
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German Aktiengesellschaft (AG)) is the most appropriate legal form for the ITO since 
this form includes most of the preconditions the national regulatory authorities need 
in order to monitor the ITO adequately. The legal framework of the German AG 
provides constitutive rules, which adequately define the relationship between the 
different bodies within the cooperation. The elements of the public limited company 
cover furthermore most of the specifications of the EU-Directives. Most of the 
national and international company laws stipulate an executive board, a supervisory 
board and a general assembly. Such legal foundations ensure a proper corporate 
structure. Moreover, there are detailed transparency rules that a public limited 
company has to follow. Mostly these are laws regarding accounting and reporting 
duties (due to the nature of this legal form). The company is required to report 
regularly and has to provide detailed information because of shareholder protection 
and interest of stakeholders. Such safeguards are qualitative monitoring, 
supervisoring and support the transparency of the ITO. Here also the question of the 
limits of transparency in an unbundled company arises: whereas the corporate law 
requires for information, the unbundling rules do not allow for information to be given 
to the vertically integrated company.  
Also, the compromise character of the ITO model might have led to taking less care 
of the relevant corporate governance aspects. Another issue as regards the fact that 
unbundling leads to  a specific energy corporate law is for the Member States to 
avoid problems in transposing and executing the EU-Directives for those energy 
undertakings, particularly those that are listed on a stock market in Europe or 
overseas. In sum, less detailed publicity obligations, as well as less constitutive rules 
and an anticipated company law which might lead to complicated statutes and 
clauses, and which will additionally lead to an extensive contract review of the 
national regulatory authorities (also to legal uncertainty) argues against the legal form 
of a private limited company or a LLC. 
 
2. The Constitution of a Financing Obligation of the Vertically 
Integrated Company 
 
Another crucial innovation is the constitution of the financing obligation for the 
vertically integrated company (Articles 17 (1) d and Article 18 (1) b) of the EU- 
Directives), which needs to be interpreted: An unlimited risk bearing would be 
contrary to the international as well as national corporate laws for public limited 
companies. The risks must be identified for an unlimited liability of the vertically 
integrated undertaking for the ITO. Despite the fact that the TSO business is low risk 
business (Prof. Dr. Siekmann: taxation power) it might create a formal problem for 
shareholders of the vertically integrated undertaking. How must the obligation for the 
vertically integrated undertaking be described in order to limit the shareholders risk to 
the obligation to finance necessary investment in the grid? In this light, the question 
arises whether such discrepancies might be removed via contractual arrangements 
between the ITO and the vertically integrated undertaking. Those will have to be 
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approved by regulators, therefore need clear legal basis. It is most likely that the 
investment levels are drastically increasing due to the need for new lines, such as for 
the integration of off-shore wind. Regarding the financial arrangements between the 
parties, the question arises as to whether the establishment of a financing obligation 
must be understood as a general liability of the vertically integrated undertaking. 
What if the ITO decides to invest in other business areas out of the energy sector, i.e. 
is the mother company liable for those matters? 
 
3. The Supervisory Body 
 
With view at the supervisory body, stipulated in Article 20 of the EU-Directives in the 
sense of a classical public limited company, there could be conflicts caused between 
the mother company and their shareholders: it is unclear whether the shareholders 
rights and the need for information and other duties of the vertically integrated 
undertaking might collide with the respective rules of the Directive. 
 
The ITO model means not only the unbundling of accounts but also the possibility for 
the vertically integrated undertaking to consolidate the ITO in its annual report. The 
requirements for financial consolidation of the ITO in the vertically integrated 
undertakings annual report in the respective national laws have to be considered 
when designing the ITO rules in Member States.  
 
4. The Compliance Officer 
 
Concerning the compliance officer, its tasks shall include diverse types of mandate, 
such as e.g. data protection officer or internal auditor. With view at its duties, it is 
questionable whether it will be considered as a “foreign body” in practice. The role of 
the compliance officer needs further description, particularly it must be clarifies 
whether it is comparable to existing bodies within compliance rules.  
 
Finally, the assignment of duties to the ITO management, particularly the day-to-day 
business in relation to the rights of the supervisory body must be treated carefully. 
There are doubts whether this in relation to corporate laws is well defined in the 
Directives or whether a clarification in national rules is required in order to avoid 
misinterpretation.  
 
5. Independence of staff 
 
Discussion arose furthermore on the issue of TSO staff shareholding of the vertically 
integrated company. Whilst the wording of the EU-Directives is quite clear on the 
separation of interests and individual shares, it was debated if a ban on sales for 
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retirement purposes could make a difference for shares as part of the pension plan. 
More so shares as part of a fund whose portfolio cannot be influenced by the staff 
members has no potential for discriminative influence of TSO staff. 
6. Cash Pooling 
 
Cash pooling as financial relationship between the TSO and the vertically integrated 
undertaking is indirectly referred to in Art. 18 (6) of the EU-Directives. Participation of 
the TSO in the cash pool of the vertically integrated undertaking was a point of 
discussion. Cash pooling agreements must not be a way to weaken the 
independence of the TSO. At the same time, it raises issues of credit standing of the 
pool operator if TSO loans money into the cash pool.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
by Prof. Dr. Jean-Michel Glachant 
 
The workshop has confirmed that the implementation of the EU-Directives will lead to 
a special energy corporate law which will deviate in singular points from the existing 
corporate law. Possible deviations from the corporate governance principles will not 
be problematic since the Directives provide for normative legally binding regulation, 
whereas the respective codes do not. Technically the transferal of the unbundling 
requirements, particularly also the ITO model are feasible options. It is the end result 
which is decisive: even if the end result of one model should not be positive, there 
are still two other models.  
Questions to be discussed further are however whether particular forms of 
implementation of the EU-Directives will allow for bypass the unbundling measures 
as well as those crucial points of practical implementation of the ITO model at 
national level, which has been proven to be from corporate law viewpoint a crucial 
issue. In the remaining 18 months before the transformation of the third package into 
national law there is still interpretative guidance needed in order to tackle the 
governance issues which arise when constructing the envisaged ITO model.   
 
Basically ten points have been identified which demand for further clarification/ 
interpretation: 
 
First of all, the adequate legal form of the ITO needs to be identified. A second point 
which needs clarification is the financing obligation for the vertically integrated 
undertaking. Thirdly, the tasks of the supervisory body need to be brought in line with 
the respective corporate structure. As a fourth point, the legal status of the 
management and fifthly, the role and function of the compliance officer need to be 
clarified. Moreover, a sixth question concerns the right to information and to check it. 
A seventh issue is the nomination of the director or CEOs and their dismissal. The 
right to allocate cash and dividends is the eighth issue to be further discussed and 
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the ability to issue shares, bonds and to significantly borrow money (= to issue 
corporate debt) the ninth. Eventually the last and tenth question concerns the new 
unbundling regime in relation to corporate governance concerns the investment plan 
(•conception •discussion •information) as a matter submitted to owners' right. 
 
In conclusion, the workshop demonstrated the need for a better understanding of 
practical implementation issues as regards the ‘third’, the ITO model.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex: 
 
• Programme and list of participants 
• Presentations Powerpoint Mag. Johannes Meyer, Prof. Dr. Jaap Winter, Prof. 
Dr. Helmut Siekmann, Dr. Chris Doyle 
 
ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES
Florence School oF regulation
Workshop
In cooperation with ERGEG Task Force on Unbundling,  
Reporting and Benchmarking (TF URB)
UnbUndling of energy Undertakings in relation to 
Corporate governanCe prinCiples
German Regulatory Office premises (Bundesnetzagentur)
Fehrbelliner Platz 3
10707 Berlin
Background Berlin, 25 September 2009
Paper in annex: “Unbundling of energy undertaking in relation to 
Corporate Governance Principles” by CEER (Council of European Energy 
Regulators).
oBjectiveS oF the WorkShop 
To clarify the ways in which corporate governance rules can provide 
a satisfactory solution to the principal-agent problems in the case 
of network companies. This is particularly relevant to the cases of 
vertically integrated companies or groups.
outline & programme
programme
 09.30 - 09.45 Registration
 09.45 - 10.05 Welcome address and introduction to the workshop 
  Johannes Kindler (Vice President BNetzA, Germany)
 Session 1 Unbundling and Corporate Governance
  Chair: Johannes Kindler (Vice President BNetzA, Germany)
 10.05 - 10.25 The legislative framework for the corporate governance structure of European  
  Energy utilities on the basis of the Third Energy Package 
  Johannes Mayer (E-Control)
 10.25 - 10.45 Questions and discussion
 10.45 - 11.05 Current status of the European debate on Corporate Governance 
  Jaap Winter (De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek & University of Amsterdam) 
 11.05 - 11.20 Questions and discussion
 11.20 - 11.40 Coffee break
 11.40 - 12.00 Lessons from the capital crisis and influences on energy undertakings 
  Helmut Siekmann (Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability, IMFS)
 12.00 - 12.20 Questions and discussion
 12.20 - 13.50 Lunch
 Session 2 Discussion on Regulation and corporate governance
  Chair: Theodor Baums (Professor, Goethe University, Frankfurt,  
  former President of the German government committee “Corporate Governance”)
 13.50 - 14.15 A Case Example, the case of BT Openreach 
  Chris Doyle (Apex Economics)
 14.15 - 15.15 Panel discussion with:  
  Nicolaas Bel (European Commission) 
  Johannes Kindler (Vice President BNetzA, Germany) 
  José Braz (ERSE, Portugal)
 15.15 - 15.45 General discussion 
 15.45 - 16.30 Conclusions 
  Jean-Michel Glachant (Director, Florence School of Regulation)
 
___________________________
Workshop proceedings: 
Nicole Ahner (Florence School of Regulation)
Participants
Juan Alba Ríos  Director, Regulatory Affairs, Endesa, Spain –  juan.alba@endesa.es
Pierre Bernard  Secretary General, Elia, Belgium – pierre.bernard@elia.be
Amine Dalibey   Strategic Division, GDF SUEZ, France – amine.dalibey@gdfsuez.com
Laurent David  Chef du Pôle Économie et Sociologie, GDF SUEZ, France – laurent-m.david@gdfsuez.com
Egidio Fedele Dell’Oste  Responsabile Direzione tariffe, AEEG, Italy – spartesana@autorita.energia.it
José Luis Fernández  REE, Spain – joselfdez@ree.es
Ilaria Galimberti  AEEG, Italy – igalimbertI@autorita.energia.it
Karin Groll  VERBUND-Austrian Power Grid AG, Austria – karin.groll@verbund.at
Gabriele Haas   Leiterin Energierecht/Regulierungsrecht, RWE, Germany – gabriele.haas@rwe.com
Ulrike Höpping  Bereich Gesellschafts- und Finanzierungsrecht, EON-Ruhrgas, Germany –  
  urlrike.hoepping@eon-ruhrgas.com
Carole Le-Henaff  Direction de la Recherche et de l’Innovation, GDF SUEZ, France – carole.le-henaff@gdfsuez.com
Gunnar Lundberg  Vice President Regulatory Affaires, Vattenfall AB, Sweden – gunnar.lundberg@vattenfall.com
Detlef Macher   Energieregulierung/Unbundling & Compliance Management Compliance Officer, EON-Ruhrgas,  
  Germany – detlef.macher@eon-ruhrgas.com
Santiago Martínez Garrido Head Legal Services, Iberdrola S.A., Spain
José Luis Mata   Head of Regulation and Studies, Red Eléctrica de España, Spain – jlmata@ree.es
Arthur Melet   DARE- Département contrôle des conditions d’accés aux réseaux, CRE, France – arthur.melet@cre.fr
Philipp-Nikolas Otto  Projektleiter Energiepolitik, EnBW, Germany – p.otto@enbw.com
Marco Piredda  Direzione Relazioni istituzionali e comunicazione, ENI, Italy – maria.anais.rossi@eni.it
Giampaolo Russo  Head of Public and Regulatory Affairs, Edison, Italy – anna.nikitina@edison.it
Martin Skovgaard Larsen  Head of Section, Danish Energy Regulatory Authority, Denmark – msl@ks.dk
Harald Stindl  Managing Director, OMV, Austria – harald.stindl@omv.com
Karin Stubenvoll  Abteilung Tarife, E-control, Austria – karin.stubenvoll@e-control.at
Francesca Valente  Regulatory and Environment Department - Executive Vice President Staff, Enel, Italy –  
  francesca.valente@enel.com
Casandra Viñuela Beato   Lawyer, Iberdrola S.A., Spain – cvinuela@iberdrola.es
Speakers/Organizers 
  
Nicole Ahner  Legal expert, FSR, Italy – nicole.ahner@eui.eu
Theodor Baums  Professor, Goethe University, Frankfurt / former President of the German government committee  
  Corporate Governance, Germany – thbaums@t-online.de
Nicolaas Bel  Representative of the European Commission, Belgium – nicholaas.bel@ec.europa.eu
Karsten Bourwieg  Senior Expert Energy Regulation, BNetzA, Germany – karsten.bourwieg@BNetzA.de
José Braz   Member of the Executive Board, ERSE, Portugal – jbraz@erse.pt
Chris Doyle  Apex Economics, UK – chris.doyle@apexeconomics.com   
Jean-Michel Glachant  Director, FSR, Italy – jean-michel.glachant@eui.eu
Nadia Horstmann  Senior Expert Energy Regulation, BNetzA, Germany – nadia.horstmann@BNetzA.de
Johannes Kindler   Vice President, BNetzA, Germany – johannes.kindler@bnetza.de
Andreas Koch  Senior Expert Energy Regulation, BNetzA, Germany – andreas.koch@BNetzA.de
Johannes Mayer   E-Control, Austria – johannes.mayer@e-control.at
Leonardo Meeus  Coordinator, FSR, Italy – leonardo.meeus@eui.eu
Sven Rode  Expert Energy Regulation, BNetzA, Germany – sven.rode@BNetzA.de
Helmut Siekmann  Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability, IMFS, Germany – geld-und-waehrung@imfs-frankfurt.de
Jaap Winter  Professor, De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek & University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands –  
  jaap.winter@debrauw.com

WS Corporate Governance and Unbundling
f C GThe Legislative Framework or the orporate overnance
Structure of European Energy Utilities
Johannes Mayer
25 September 2009
Principles of Unbundling
Unbundling of Functions
Separation of management and of employees
Independent identity of distribution system operator
Unbundling of Professional Interest
Independent incentives, only related to network business; 
Unbundling of Decisions
Vertically integrated company is pure financial investor (‘first bank‘)
Decisions of investment, maintenance and operation fully independent
Unbundling of Information
No privilege in information flows between Network Operator and 
integrated company
The ISO Model (Independent 
System Operator) 
Governing Principle:
Separation of Ownership of Assets and all decisions taken by fully 
unbundled TSO (operation, maintenance, investment)
Consequence:
Asset Owner is reduced to financial investor 
Asset Owner in principle has to invest or to agree to third party 
financing following the decision of the System Operator
Asset Owner has to cover liability relating to network assets and 
to provide guarantees to facilitate financing 
The ITO Model (Independent 
Transmission Operator) 
Governing Principle:
Vertical integration of network company and competitive business
Consequences:
TSO has to own necessary assets, 
TSO has sufficient resources for independent decision making        
(human, technical, physical, financial)
Independent decision making concerning assets
Power to raise money on capital market through borrowing and 
capital increase
The ITO Model (Independent 
Transmission Operator) cont‘d  –
Independent information flows
Independent management and staff;
Commercial and financial relations have to be approved by 
national Regulatory Authority
Supervisory Body to take decisions with significant impact on 
value of assets, i.e. approval of budget, financial plans, level of 
i d bt d d di id d di t ib t d t h h ldn e e ness an  v en s s r u e  o s are o ers
No say in day-to-day activities
50%-1 of SB members independent of vertically integrated 
company
Conclusions
Main idea of unbundling is utmost separation of two integrated 
parts of a company
Holding company acts either as a ‘qualified bank‘ or has to 
divest
All relations (services, financial, commercial) are either not 
allowed or have to be approved by the NRA
All communication has to be monitored by the NRA
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EU Company Law and 
Corporate Governance  
Jaap Winter 
Berlin
25 S t b 2009 ep em er 
EU Involvement in Company Law
• Basis is freedom of establishment
• Effective use of freedom requires harmonisation of 
company law, art. 44 (g)
• Peculiar objective: with a view to making 
protections for members (shareholders) and 
others (creditors employees) equivalent ,  
• Avoid race to the bottom
• Not: efficient company law facilitating business      
activities across borders
Harmonisation Process
• Formalities of company law, little substance
• On substance Member States disagreed on how       
to harmonise
• Protections of others troubling
• Creditors: nobody outside Germany believes in 
restricting capital maintenance provisions of 2nd 
Directi ev
• Employees: European Company Statute and 
Directive and Cross-Border Merger Directive to 
help defend German Mitbestimmung
On Shareholders and National Interests
• Clashes on Takeover Bids and controling shareholders
• 13th Directive to facilitate level playing field for takeover bids        
• Member States protecting national interests, outcome is 
opposite of level playing field
M j it f li t d i h t lli h h ld• a or y o  s e  compan es as con ro ng s are o ers
• Often mechanisms applied that enhance control 
disproportionally
• After much deliberation and intense lobbying no action
EU Court of Justice Motor of Convergence
• Decisions on freedom of establishment: Member 
St t t f t t l th ia es canno  re use o accep  or app y e r own 
company law rules on companies incorporated in 
other Member State  
• Result sweeping development of simplification 
and flexibilisation of Member State company law 
by national initiatives
• Convergence to common denominator rather than 
harmonisation by agreement
EU on Corporate Governance
• Development in last 10 years primarily for listed companies, driven 
by harmonisation of securities legislation and governance scandals 
in US and EU
• Dominated by principal – agent discussion: how to ensure that 
management operates in interests of shareholders
• National best practice codes, comply or explain
• Flexibility 
• Accountability
• Focus of codes on organisation and functioning of boards
• Non-binding EU guidance on non-executive directors and director 
remuneration (additional 2009)
• Corporate governance disclosure (4th and 7th dir)
Focus EU Approach
• Board performance
• separation Chairman – CEO
• increased role of non-execs
• committees
• independence
• Shareholder engagement and dialogue
B d t t f t t• oar s o accoun  or governance s ruc ure
• shareholders to challenge boards
• using their rights to enforce    
Wobbly Basis of EU Approach
• Governance codes plus comply or explain are 
i t lexper men a
• Intuitively sound but no assurance of success
• No tested infrastructure  
• Assumption of shareholder control
Weak Code Infrastructure
• No Code requirement on Member States
• Only art 46a 4th Dir: .    
• Listed company required to comply or explain under 
Code it is subject to or voluntarily applies
• Double and no application as result of basis of         
Code in listing rules or corporate law
• Air Berlin Plc
• Forum recommendation; no response from Commission     
• No consistent system of monitoring and 
amendment of Codes
N d t di f lit f l ti• o un ers an ng o  qua y o  exp ana ons
EU Difficulties with Shareholder 
Enforcement: Cross-Border Voting
• Lack of efficient cross-border voting infrastructure
• Chains of security intermediaries
• No clear right of ultimate investor to exercise voting right
• No obligation of security intermediaries to facilitate      
• Forum: create intermediary obligation in Shareholders 
Rights Directive 
• But no: SRD no solution
• Paradox: US restricted rights but efficient voting system, EU 
strong rights but underdeveloped voting system
Controlling Shareholders and 
Di i lisproport ona ty
• Majority listed companies on Continent have controlling 
shareholders
• Controlling shareholders explain to themselves
• Regulatory pressure of Code reduced/removed
• Enhance role for independent NEDs? Enhance role of regulators?
• Exacerbated by disproportionality
• Incentive to abuse: costs disproportionally borne by outside 
shareholders
• Forum recommendation: enhanced qualitative disclosure 
Commission: no action on proportionality, not even enhanced 
disclosure
EU Not Taking the Code Experiment Seriously
• Management and controlling shareholders determine 
national agenda’s
• Concerns ride the trend of national protection (13th Dir)        
• National goverments determine EU decisions, current 
Commission is weak, not even trying
W k EU i t tl ti d b t ith US id f• ea ens  n ransa an c e a e w  : no ea o  
effectiveness of EU approach
• EU will get US style compliance and enforcement which it 
it d t tsays  oes no  wan  
• Worse: we dull ourselves into illusion of having proper 
governance regulations and systems
Study on Code Infrastructure
• RiskMetrics commissioned by EU Commission
• Market wide monitoring may help to raise quality of         
explanations
• Shareholder engagement concentrated in few hands
I t i it i b l t i k t ith• n ens ve mon or ng y regu a ors n some mar e s w  
strong controlling shareholders (Spain, Portugal) 
• Risk of enhanced regulatory framework, replacing dialogue 
with shareholders
• Changing institutional investor behaviour: concentration of 
investments engaged share ownership?,   
The Need for a New Governance Agenda
• We don’t know whether governance EU style works, and if 
so why and when (and why and when not)
• Serious concerns remain
• Experimental nature of codes, without established code 
infrastructure
• Dilution of code and comply or explain effects by controlling 
shareholders
• Lack of transparency of control structures
• Lack of shareholder voting legal and practical infrastructure
• Shareholder voting manipulation, empty voting
• Continued incontestability of control
Lack of understanding of minority shareholder protection•       
Lessons from the Financial 
Market Crisis Designing   
Supervision and Control of 
Transmission System Operators
Professor Dr. Helmut Siekmann
Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability
Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt am Main
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Syllabus
A. Foundations
B. Transmission System Operators
C Th V ti ll I t t d E t i. e er ca y n egra e  n erpr se
D. Regulatory Authorities of Member 
States
E. Agency for the Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators - ACER  
F. Conclusions
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A. Foundations
I. Basic Insight from the Crisis
II. Competition in a Natural Monopoly
III. Unbundling 
IV. Structure of Transmission System Providers
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A I Basic Insight from the Crisis. .     
1. Measures of self-regulation have demonstrated a very       
poor performance.
2. The participation of regulated industries in the process 
of law-making ought to be eliminated as far as possible.
3. Government influence is of an ambiguous nature. 
4. There is no clear evidence that intervention of politics 
caused or exacerbated the crisis.
f f f5. I  the ield to be regulated is so crucial or common 
welfare that governments have to step in, in case of 
distress, governments must have close control of it.
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A I Basic Insight from the Crisis. .     
6. In essence, regulation of such an industry has to be 
exercise of police power.
7. Full transparency of risks is indispensable.
8. The widespread complexity of norms was a major 
contributing factor.
9. Oversight on a global or European level is 
indispensible only under certain, narrow pre-requisits.
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A II Competition in a Natural Monopoly. .     
Natural monopoly: 
c(x1+x2) < c(x1) + c(x2)
for all x1, x2 > 0
in reality usually but not necessarily  ,    
decreasing average costs 
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A.II. Competition in a Natural Monopoly     
Examples for natural monopolies: network     
economies
‐ railroads
‐ natural gas 
‐ electricity
‐ [telecommunication]
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A.II. Competition in a Natural Monopoly     
Basically two alternatives:
Competition for the market (e g commuter-     . .  
railroad service)
- Free and non-discriminatory access to the 
infrastructure (e.g. electricity, long distance 
train traffic)
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A.II. Competition in a Natural Monopoly     
Corollary:
- Strict supervision of (private) monopolies    
- Organizing the competition for the market
- Permanent control of the free and non-
discriminatory access
- Charges for using the transmission-network
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A.III. Unbundling 
Crucial distinctions:
- Ownership of infrastructure
- Possession of infrastructure (e.g. lease)
- Maintenance of infrastructure
Investment in infrastructure-   
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A.III. Unbundling 
Separation of 
- (Transmission-)Infrastructure
- Production
- Transport
- Supply (Distribution)
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A.III. Unbundling 
Unbundling does not necessarily require 
economically and legally separate entities     
with no ties – of any kind.
Prof. Dr. Helmut Siekmann CEER Berlin 25.9.2009 12
A.III. Unbundling 
1. Separate enterprises for the 
(transmission-)infrastructure and the 
production, transport, distribution
1. “Siblings” of such firms
2 Eith i th d ht f h. er one  s mo er or  aug er o  suc  an 
enterprise
2. Vertically integrated firms
3. Ownership or right of property
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A.IV. Structure of Transmission System 
P idrov ers
1. Separate ownership of infrastructure
with operation, maintenance, and investment by the 
owner
2 F ll ti ll i t t d t i. u y ver ca y n egra e  en erpr se
with all functions concerning operation, maintenance 
and access to the infrastructure separated within the 
firm
3. Partially vertically integrated enterprise
seperate ownership of infrastructure but with      
operation, maintenance, and perhaps investments 
by a person other than the owner
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B. Transmission System Operators
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B. Transmission System Operators   
Options of the Directives 2009/72/EC     
(electricity) and 2009/73/EC (natural gas):
1. Ownership Unbundling – OU  (Art. 9 I)
2 I d d t T i i O t ITO (A t. n epen en   ransm ss on  pera or –   r . 
17‐19 II‐VIII)
3 Independent System Operator ISO (Art 13 I 1.      –   .       –
electricity, Art. 14 I 1 – natural gas)
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B. Transmission System Operators   
Ownership Unbundling 
- Competence of Article 95 Treaty
- Compatibility with Article 295 Treaty?
- Unlawful taking?
(protection of property, e.g. ECJ 2002 I – 9011 at No.29 –
Roquettes Frères)
- Infringement of occupational freedom?   
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C Th V ti ll I t t d E t i. e er ca y n egra e  n erpr se
I. The Set-up
II. ERGEG-Guidelines
III P i i l f CEER. r nc p es o   
IV. Guidelines of the Commission 
V Rules set up by ACER.     
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C. I. The Set-up   
Stipulated independence:
Effectively independent decision-making rights for the 
transmission system operator
Problems:
U l b d i- nc ear oun ar es
- Unresolved conflicts of interest
- Appropriation of funds for investments in transmission 
system
- Risks off-balance sheet possible
- Incentive structure opaque
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C. I. The Set-up   
Eventually too many details will be left to 
individual agreements which are not 
transparent to the capital market.
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C. I. The Set-up   
? Composition of Supervisory Body   
? Role of Compliance Officer
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C.II. ERGEG Guidelines   
ERGEG-Guidelines for Good Practice of 15 July 
2008 are of questionable legal status.
- European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas 
(ERGEG) is neither an organ nor an institution of the          
EU
- It is doubtful whether the necessary mandate by the 
federal government to act in matters of foreign relations         
has been granted.
- The group has no competence to set any type of legal 
norms.
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C.III. CEER Critical Corporate 
G Iovernance ssues
Council of European Energy Regulators 
(CEER): “Unbundling of energy undertakings 
in relation to Corporate Governance 
Principles”
Corporate governance principles are no legal norms-       .
- The function of corporate governance principles is 
primarily to foster capital markets and their efficiency.
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C.III. CEER Critical Corporate 
G Iovernance ssues
- Provisions safeguarding the independence of the 
t i i t t h di t thransm ss on sys em opera or ave no rec  on e 
capital market.
- Indirect effects have yet to be proven and might be          
minute depending on the revenue the transmission 
system operator may collect.
Corporate governance principles and their-      
implementation in national statutes do not prevent the 
national legislation to set up different rules for 
utilities. 
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C.III. CEER Critical Corporate 
G Iovernance ssues
? In essence, the key question will be the 
magnitude of the user charges the 
transmission system operator is entitled to 
collect.
? Only existing rights of shareholders might 
deserve protection. New investors know what 
th i t tey are go ng o ge . 
? Utilities have always “enjoyed” special 
treatment by legislation  .
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C.IV. Guidelines of the Commission    
Guidelines adopted by the Commission pursuant      
Article 14 sec.3 (Directive electricity), Article 15 
sec.3 (Directive natural gas)
“designed to amend non-essential elements of this 
Directive by supplementing it”
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C. V. Rules set up by ACER      
? Framework guidelines of the Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), 
Article 4 e Regulation (EC) No. 713/2009 of 13 
July 2009 
- Non binding
- Adressed at the Commission   
? Recommandations to assist national regulatory 
authorities Article 7 sec 2 Regulation,   .  
? Framework for cooperation of national regulatory 
authorities Article 7 sec 3 Regulation
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,   .  
D Regulatory Authorities of Member.     
States
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D. Regulatory Authorities of Member 
St ta es
Guarantee of Independence:  
“Member States shall ensure that … the regulatory 
authority… 
( )a  …
(b) ensures that its staff and the persons responsible for 
its management:
(i)–  …
– (ii) do  not seek or take direct instruction from any 
government or other public or private entity when 
carrying out regulatory tasks”   .
(Article 35 sec.4 Directive 2009/72/EC – electricity; Article 39 sec.4 Directive 
2009/73/EC – natural gas)
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D. Regulatory Authorities of Member 
St ta es
“In order to protect the independence of the regulatory 
authority, Member States shall in particular ensure that:
(a)the regulatory authority can take autonomous 
d i i i d d tl f liti l b d d hec s ons,  n epen en y  rom any po ca   o y, an   as 
separate annual budget allocations, with autonomy in the 
implementation of the allocated budget, and adequate 
human and financial resources to carry out its duties; and
(b)( … )”
(Article 35 sec.5 Directive 2009/72/EC – electricity; Article 39 sec.5 
Directive 2009/73/EC – natural gas)
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D. Regulatory Authorities of Member 
St ta es
? It has not been proven that political influence on 
supervisory agencies contributed in a significant way 
to the present crisis or other major malfunction of the 
economy.
? It is very questionable whether these provision can be 
upheld in view of democratic principles in EU-law and 
in the German Federal Constitution. 
? The independence of the ECB and its member central 
banks is explicitly guaranteed by primary EU-law 
(Art.108 Treaty) and by the Federal German 
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Constitution, Art.88 sentence 2 GG.
E. Agency for the Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators (ACER)
I. Setting up the Agency
II. European Supervision of Financial Markets
III. Democratic Rule and Institutional Balance
IV. Structure of ACER
V. Lack of Control
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E.I. Setting up ACER   
ACER has been established by Article 1 I of         
Regulation (EC) 713/2009 of 13 July 2009
‐ Based on Article 95 of the Treaty
P t d t i di id l d i i‐ ower  o a op   n v ua   ec s ons
‐ Legal personality
‐ Not only a decentralised network
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E.I. Setting up ACER   
? Article 95 Sec.1 sentence 2 Treaty
“approximation of the provisions laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action in Member States”
[„Angleichung der Rechts‐ und Verwaltungsvorschriften       
der Mitgliedsstaaten]
? Need for European regulatory agency     
questionable
– Not necessary for non-binding framework guidelines     
– Breach of contract procedure in case of insufficient 
transformation of directives
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E.II. European Supervision of Financial 
M k tar e s
- European Systemic Risk Council (ESRC)
- European System of Financial Supervision 
(ESFS)
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E.II. European Supervision of Financial 
M k tar e s
European Authorities replacing the „level3“ 
committees
‐ Commission of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS)
C i i f E S iti R l t (CESR)‐ omm ss on o   uropean  ecur es  egu a ors 
‐ Committee of European Insurance and Occupational 
P i S i (CEIOPS)ens ons  uperv sors 
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E.III. Democratic Rule and Institutional 
B la ance
Meroni-doctrine
To protect democratic principles the European Court of 
Justice ruled in the “Meroni” case (EuGH Urteil vom 
13.06.1958, Rs. 9/56, Slg. 1958, 11) that only bodies 
with an democratic legitimization are authorized to 
render legally binding decisions It developed the   .    
principle of preserving institutional balance and 
emphasized the limitation of delegating powers to 
i d d t E i tit ti N di tin epen en  uropean ns u ons. o scre onary 
power was to be delegated to such entities.
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E.III. Democratic Rule and Institutional 
B la ance
Meroni-doctrine observed?
- Article 7 Sec.1 Regulation “individual decisions”
- Article 7 Sec.3 Regulation “framework for cooperation”
- Article 7 Sec.7 Regulation “decide … on access and 
security”
- Article 8 Sec.1, 2, 4 Regulation “competence … by 
Guidelines of the Commission”
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E.IV. Structure of ACER   
- Administrative Board
- Board of Regulators
Director-  
- Board of Appeal
- Financed by subsidy from the Community, fees, 
voluntary contributions, legacies, donations
OLAF (Office européen de lutte anti fraude) is-      -   
fully applicable
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E.V. Lack of Control   
- Almost no supervision by governments or EU-
organs
- Guaranteed independence of members of the 
Board of Regulators
- Weak judicial control
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F. Conclusions
Prof. Dr. Helmut Siekmann CEER Berlin 25.9.2009 41
Prof. Dr. Helmut Siekmann
Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability
Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität
G ü b l t 1r ne urgp a z 
60629 Frankfurt am Main
Germany
Phone: +49 (0)69 798-34014
Fax: +49 (0)69 798-33913
E Mail: geld und waehrung@imfs frankfurt de-  - - - .
Internet: www.imfs-frankfurt.de
Prof. Dr. Helmut Siekmann CEER Berlin 25.9.2009 42
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Telecoms vs Energy in the EU
• Vertical network industry
• Regulated bottlenecks
• Vertical network Industry
• Regulated bottlenecks
• Unbundling of some 
services (local loop)
N d t b dli
• Unbundling of network 
services
M d t l l• o man a ory un un ng 
of businesses
– Functional separation is 
• an a ory ega  
separation of ITOs 
allowing common 
proposed as an ultimate 
measure
• Why pressure for 
ownership
unbundling?
– Non-price discrimination
Models of Unbundling
6 Ownership separation (in whole or part) Full structural separation – may 
involve club ownership of 
bottleneck 
5 Legal separation (separate legal entities 
under common ownership) 
Legal separation (which may or 
may not embody elements of 
functional separation) 
4 Functional separation with localised Variants on functional separation     
incentives and/or separate governance 
arrangements 
3 Functional separation 
   
2 Virtual separation 
1 Creation of a wholesale division 
 Accounting separation 
Variants on accounting separation 
 
BT Openreach: Overview
• Openreach owns, maintains and 
develops the BT access network 
which links homes and businesses 
• The regulator Ofcom launched a 
Telecommunications Strategic 
Review (TSR), December 2003
to the networks of Britain’s 
communications providers
• Customers are given equivalent
t th BT l l d
• After extensive public 
consultation, Ofcom accepted a 
set of Undertakings, or legally-
bi di it t ff d baccess o e  oca  access an  
backhaul networks, this enables 
them to provide their customers 
with everything from analogue 
n ng comm men s, o ere  y 
BT (supported by UK competition 
law)
• Undertakings signed between BT
telephone lines and calls 
packages, to high speed 
broadband connections and 
complex networked IT solutions
    
and Ofcom on 22 September 2005
• Openreach operations started 
January 2006
   
Openreach responsibility and line of service
Principles of Unbundling
1. Unbundling of functions
• YES
2. Unbundling of 
professional interest
• YES
3. Unbundling of decisions
• NO – BT Group plc is not 
fi i l i ta pure nanc a  nves or
4. Unbundling of 
information
• YES
The Undertakings
• The establishment of Openreach 
requires BT to adhere to the 
commitments in the Undertakings
• Openreach remains part of the BT 
Group, though it is a separate 
business with its own:
• The Undertakings have required:
– Changes to BT’s internal systems, 
processes and ways of working.
– Updating and developing employees’
– Headquarters, 
– Identity
– Financial reporting and 
– Commercial principles    
skills and 
– The implementation of a Code of 
Practice
• Openreach has changed
 
• The progress and performance of 
Openreach in meeting the 
Undertakings is monitored by an 
   
fundamentally the way employees 
are incentivised
– The Openreach senior management 
d t t i f l li k d
independent Equality of Access 
Board (EAB)
rewar  s ruc ure s, or examp e, n e  
solely to the performance of Openreach
Equality of Access Board
• Established November 2005
• The EAB monitors compliance 
with the Undertakings
• The EAB consists of five 
members: three independents, 
one BT Group plc non-executive   
• The EAB also assesses the 
delivery of Equivalence of Inputs 
by Openreach and regularly 
director and one BT senior 
manager
• The EAB shall publish in June 
h l t itreports to the BT Group Board 
and to Ofcom
• The EAB is a committee of the BT 
Group plc Board It is supported
eac  year an annua  repor  on s 
activities as a distinct part of BT’s 
annual regulatory compliance 
report. The EAB annual report   .    
by the EAB Secretariat and the 
Equality of Access Office (EAO)
shall be audited by independent 
external auditors
Openreach governance Structure –
it i limon or ng comp ance
Formal and informal channels are used
CPs = Communication Providers
EAB role within BT
BT Governance Structure
• The governance structure that 
was established in 2005/6 has 
remained largely unaltered in
– BT Group Undertakings 
Programme Team: supports the 
Enterprise Programme Board by 
idi l it i d    
function
• The current framework 
consists of the:
prov ng regu ar mon or ng an  
reporting information on BT’s 
delivery of the Undertakings
  
– Enterprise Programme Board: a 
group-wide body for setting policy 
and direction, managing priorities, 
resolving issues and ensuring
– BT’s line of business 
Undertakings programme delivery 
offices:
• provide detailed Undertakings     
consistency across BT’s lines of 
business
progress reports to the 
Undertakings Programme Team 
and to the EAB.
Governance and Investment
• 5.28 With effect from the BT financial year 2006/2007, AS shall establish an 
annual operating plan which shall be submitted to the BT Group plc Board 
for approval. Once approved, execution of that plan shall be the 
responsibility of the AS CEO and the AS Management Board. The plan will 
establish the budget, including capital and operating expenditure, for AS. 
The plan shall include plans and targets for implementing and applying 
those sections of these Undertakings applicable to AS for the relevant year           . 
Following each year of operation of AS such plan shall include a 
commentary on the previous year’s implementation and application of these 
Undertakings as they apply to AS. The annual operating plan and 
commentary shall be shared with the EAB.
• 5.29 The AS CEO shall have delegated authority from the BT Group plc 
Board to authorise capital expenditure of up to £75 million within the annual 
operating plan referred to in section 5 28 This limit may be varied from time      . .        
to time at the discretion of the BT Group plc Board. Ofcom and the EAB 
shall be notified of such variation within five working days.
EAB Opinions
• “satisfied that these 
[governance structures] 
f ti i ll d
• “worked well in terms of 
monitoring and reporting 
b t th l t fare unc on ng we  an  
that it is effective in 
monitoring progress and 
u  ere are e emen s o  
BT’s governance of 
specific processes, for 
advising BT on future 
steps”
– Page 7 EAB Annual Report 2009
example, Openreach 
billing and product 
management processes        
that need to be improved”
– Page 15 EAB Annual Report 2009
Ofcom Opinions
• “Our annual evaluation continues 
to indicate that the net effect of the 
Undertakings to date, both for 
competition and consumers has
• “The EAB has continued to build 
its organisational credibility by 
performing its compliance duties 
in an effective and objective    
been positive”
– Executive Summary, Ofcom, Impact of the 
Strategic Review of Telecoms: 
Implementation Review, May 2009
     
manner.”
– Para 5.20, Ofcom, Impact of the Strategic 
Review of Telecoms: Implementation Review, 
May 2009
• “We consider that Openreach has 
made good progress in becoming 
• We continue to remain of the view 
that the Undertakings are an 
appropriate and comprehensivea functionally independent entity. 
It is now a recognised brand that 
is operating on a more stable, 
business as usual basis ”
   
solution to the competition 
concerns that we set out in the 
TSR  , .
– Para 5.14, Ofcom, Impact of the Strategic 
Review of Telecoms: Implementation Review, 
May 2009
– Para 1.40, Ofcom, Impact of the Strategic 
Review of Telecoms: Implementation Review, 
May 2009
Competitors’ Opinion
• “We enjoy the partnership relationship we 
have with Openreach rather than us being  ,     
just another customer and Openreach just 
another supplier ” .
J ti Fi ld– us n e er
• Director of Research & New Technologies, BSkyB
Independent Opinion
“The implementation of functional separation in the UK to date has 
not been without its problems. The unravelling of the numerous 
relationships that bound Openreach with the rest of BT has been           
complicated, probably more so than anticipated when the 
undertakings were agreed in late 2005. As the relationships have 
been unwound, BT has asked for exemptions and variations from 
the undertakings as well as for more time. If nothing else, the 
difficulties that have been encountered should be sufficient for any 
government/regulator that is considering the replication of the UK 
approach to functional separation to think twice.”
“Is Functional Separation BT-Style the Answer?” Jason Whalley & Peter Curwen, 
Communications & Strategies no. 71, 3rd quarter 2008, pp. 160-161.
Compliance Performance
Concluding Remarks 1
• The governance structures 
established to oversee Openreach 
in the UK appear to have 
• The governance arrangements 
appear to have adapted well to 
changing circumstances
functioned effectively, though a 
number of difficulties have 
emerged
Th i ht bi lf
• Has it been a nightmare for the 
regulator? 
• e overs g  com nes se -
regulation (reinforced by legally 
binding commitments – ‘the 
undertakings’), independent audit 
• No – but it has been 
administratively detailed (hence 
relatively costly) and has cost BT 
more than £100m to establish and
and external regulation
• The structure in practice is 
complex, but probably no more so 
th i il t t f d i
      
increased opex
an s m ar s ruc ures oun s n 
the financial services sector
Concluding Remarks 2
• The European Commission has 
advocated the need for functional 
separation as an ultimate measure
• Jury still out on the net 
benefits/costs in the UK – study 
required
• There is much opposition to 
functional separation – among 
operators and some regulators 
( A i F )
• Outside the EU separation has 
been considered in Australia 
e.g. rcep n rance
• A number of NRAs have chosen 
not to apply functional separation 
(Opta in NL), others have
where the Federal Government 
announced on 15 August 2009 
structural separation (legal 
separation) of the incumbent     
threatened application (UKE in 
PL), some incumbents have 
volunteered application (Telecom 
It li T li S )
    
Telstra – a model similar to the 
third energy package 
a a, e a- onera
Thank you
